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3 August 1959

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**Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt**

## II. ASIA-AFRICA

25X1 Laos: [The military situation in northern Laos remains grave, with Communist partisans retaining the initiative. Senior Lao officials continue to emphasize the participation of North Vietnamese troops. Although their evidence is inconclusive, it is probable that North Vietnam is involved in the planning and direction of the attacks and that North Vietnamese-trained elements are engaged in the fighting. Hanoi has warned that it cannot remain indifferent to the developments in Laos which, it alleges, threaten the security of North Vietnam.] [redacted]

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OK Tunisia-Czechoslovakia: President Bourguiba's decision to exchange ambassadors with Czechoslovakia--after having rebuffed Czech overtures six weeks ago--may be a move to silence internal criticism that he has been dilatory in opening relations with the Soviet bloc. Bourguiba probably will at a later date also exchange ambassadors with the Soviet Union. Such steps probably foreshadow no change in Tunisia's basic policy of Western-oriented "nonengagement." [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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NO Israel-UAR: [The chief of staff of the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) has warned that a serious new incident may occur between the Syrians and Israelis as a result of the movement of a platoon of heavily armed Israeli "police" into the southern demilitarized zone south of Lake Tiberias on 29 July. The Israelis claim that the force has been deployed to protect construction of a road for use by agricultural equipment. The UNTSO official and UAR officers believe, however, that the road is military in purpose, and threatens to outflank Syrian front-line positions]

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### III. THE WEST

NO Cyprus: General George Grivas [has privately called on his former top aides in Cyprus to be ready to abandon Archbishop Makarios, but his] two top lieutenants in the EOKA movement, who are cabinet ministers in the transitional government, have already indicated they will continue to support Makarios. Support from such quarters will greatly assist Makarios in pursuing his moderate policies for Cyprus in the face of criticism from extremists such as Grivas.

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
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DAILY BRIEF

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Britain - Central Africa: Criticism by a special commission of the handling of last winter's disorders in Nyasaland may indirectly increase African unrest there. [London is unlikely to initiate any significant corrective action which could be construed as an admission of errors before the British general elections expected in October, and the Macmillan government will therefore remain vulnerable to Labor charges that "police state" conditions are allowed to continue.] In Nyasaland itself, the criticism has strengthened the appeal of the nationalist movement led by the imprisoned Dr. Hastings Banda.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### Situation in Laos

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[The military situation in northern Laos remains grave. Communist partisan forces apparently retain the initiative in large areas of Sam Neua Province, following their initial attacks in mid-July, and most recently have extended their operations to the southeastern corner of Phong Saly Province. The previously reported incidents of 27 July in central Laos have not yet been followed by other indications of a country-wide uprising, although the mining of roads in both central Laos and to the south of Sam Neua Province has been reported.]

[The Laotian Government has sent small numbers of reinforcements to Sam Neua Province, but their effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated. The government's capability to reinforce is hampered by the need to retain troops on security missions in other potentially troublesome areas, by its limited airlift capability, and by the rugged nature of the northern terrain--a heavily forested, mountainous area with few trails. The Lao Air Force commander has stated that, as of 29 July, four of his six C-47s were undergoing repair.]

[In recent official briefings, senior Lao authorities have emphasized the involvement of North Vietnamese troops. They believe this is a major infiltration effort, rather than an invasion, to set up bases of dissidence with clandestine North Vietnamese support in order to regain control of the two former Pathet Lao provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly. While their evidence thus far--several weapons and grenades, the statements of a captured tribesman, and of two Lao Army soldiers who escaped after capture by the enemy--is inconclusive, North Vietnamese complicity in terms of supply and leadership is highly probable, and it is also probable that North Vietnam-trained units are engaged in the fighting. Hanoi has warned that it will not remain indifferent to developments in Laos. The]

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[ ] locale of much of the fighting readily permits covert supply from across the border.]

[The Communists probably estimate that any demonstrated inability of the Laotian Government to cope with the partisan attacks will bring effective pressure on the Laotian Government and the West for the return of the International Control Commission (ICC). Peiping and Hanoi probably regard the ICC as the best means at present for restoring an atmosphere favorable for the expansion of Communist assets in Laos, assuring Laotian neutrality, and frustrating US and French efforts to train the Laotian Army. With cumulative evidence of the present Phoui government's pro-US orientation, coupled with its moderate success in undercutting Communist strength in some sections of the country, the propaganda from Peiping and Hanoi has reflected increasing concern over the deteriorating Communist position in Laos. The relatively poor showing of the Laotian Army in June against the renegade Pathet Lao battalion may have encouraged Peiping and Hanoi to act while local partisan capabilities were still sufficient to keep the Laotian Government off balance.]

[During his visit to the Soviet Union last month, North Vietnam's President Ho Chi Minh undoubtedly discussed with Soviet leaders the problem of Communist strategy in Laos. At his next meeting with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd on 3 August, Gromyko probably will renew Soviet pressure for reconvening the truce commission.]

[Meanwhile, an Indian official in New Delhi has implied his government's concern, as chairman of the ICC, over how to deal with Communist bloc objections to the recent introduction of American military training personnel into Laos. Commonwealth Secretary Desai stated it was unfortunate that the Laotian Government had itself requested American instructors; if the French, who are permitted under the Geneva truce terms to maintain a training mission, had made the request, there would have been no legal basis for objection. Desai also noted that the current activity in Laos was another clear indication of the reason why India feels meetings of the ICC "when needed" could be helpful in confirming allegations of foreign intervention.]

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Tunisia Announces Decision to Exchange Ambassadors  
With Czechoslovakia

President Bourguiba's decision to exchange ambassadors with Czechoslovakia "came as a surprise," according to a Tunisian Foreign Secretariat official. In mid-June, Bourguiba was reported to have rebuffed the third Czech request for an exchange of diplomatic representatives. His move now may be an effort to silence criticism that he has been dilatory about opening relations with the Soviet bloc, although he made a decision in principle some time ago to do so.

A Czech ambassador is expected to arrive in Tunis this month and become the first Soviet bloc diplomat accredited to Tunisia. Until his arrival, the chief of the Czech trade mission--which has succeeded in increasing Czech-Tunisian trade--will act as chargé. Rather than open an embassy in Prague, Tunisia may be represented by its ambassador in Rome.

The American chargé in Tunis comments that the choice of Czechoslovakia, rather than the USSR or Communist China, is typical of Bourguiba's gradualism, but that an exchange of diplomatic representatives with the USSR is probably "only a matter of time." The exchange of representatives represents no change in Tunisia's foreign policy of Western-oriented "nonengagement" with either power bloc.

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## III. THE WEST

Makarios Gets Support From Former Top EOKA Leaders

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(Former EOKA leader George Grivas has followed his recent public announcement dissociating himself from responsibility for the Cyprus accords with a private call to ministers of the transitional government of Cyprus to be ready to abandon Archbishop Makarios.) Several ministers of the transitional government were formerly active in EOKA, including Minister of Communications Georghiades and Minister of Labor Georkadjis, who were Grivas' top lieutenants. Both informed the American consul general in Nicosia on 30 July that they regretted Grivas' recent announcement and were attempting to convince him not to continue his campaign; they stated that no minister would resign. Georghiades flew to Athens on 31 July, reportedly to tell Grivas that 90 percent of the leadership of the right-wing Greek Cypriot nationalist front, which succeeded EOKA last spring, was supporting Makarios, and to warn him that only the Turks and Communists stand to gain from the developing rift between himself and the Archbishop.

If Makarios can retain the support of the former EOKA leaders, he will be in a strong position to rebuff attempts by Grivas to upset the Cyprus settlements. He is also in a position to cite--as the Greek Government has already done--speeches by Grivas at the time the settlement was negotiated, calling on the Cypriots to support Makarios and to ignore those who would disrupt Greek Cypriot unity.

Turkish Cypriots fear that the rift between Makarios and Grivas will allow the extremists to intimidate the moderate leadership into more intransigent positions on questions regarding the settlement still to be resolved. The extremists have a potential leader on Cyprus in the person of Bishop Kyprianos of Kyrenia, who has never accepted the settlement and still demands union of the island with Greece. A few fanatics, looking to Kyprianos and Grivas for leadership, could cause a dangerous revival of intercommunal tension by isolated acts of terrorism.

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### London's Inaction May Lead to Further Unrest in Central Africa

[The special Devlin Commission's criticisms of the British Government's handling of last winter's disturbances in Nyasaland are likely to bolster the African nationalist movement there, led by the imprisoned Dr. Hastings Banda. The American consul general in Salisbury believes that the far-reaching charges of government overstatement and misrepresentation concerning the African "massacre plot" will substantially enhance the general feeling of unrest and uncertainty already plaguing the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The extent to which unrest increases largely depends upon whether any corrective action is taken toward Banda, who still appears unchallenged as leader of the Nyasaland nationalists.]

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[The highly charged political atmosphere in Britain inhibits the Macmillan government from taking such action. The American Embassy in London believes that any major British initiative, such as negotiation with the nationalist leadership, is effectively precluded until after the general elections anticipated in October. Although failure to act leaves the government vulnerable to Labor party charges of maintaining the "police state" conditions which the commission cited, the Conservatives evidently prefer not to risk their slim popular lead by seeming to acknowledge the correctness of the Labor party's charges. Despite the normally limited electoral appeal of colonial questions, the Labor party's failure to win popularity with its economic or foreign policy programs makes it especially eager to exploit this issue.]

[British partisan differences over African policy have further threatened the prospects for Nyasaland and the federation by the clash two weeks ago over preparations for the review of the federation's constitution expected next year.]

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